Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ireland. Show all posts

Understanding The Peace Process

Following the Ealing bomb and the arrests of the three republicans in Columbia, right-wing commentators sought to extract concessions from Irish republicanism. With the declaration of ‘war against terrorism’ the clamour became deafening. As part of a strategm of blaming republicans for the failure of the Peace Process and to maximize perceived advantage David Trimble has today withdrawn the Ulster Unionist Party’s three members from the Six-County Executive.

But as A.Shaw argues, the anti-IRA elements on left and right are all ignoring one elementary fact – unionism has nowhere else to go.


"You know my method. It is founded upon the observation of trifles" is a famous Sherlock Holmes quote. As in crime, as in politics, a truer understanding of the bigger picture can be found in the study of the small seemingly insignificant detail, the chance encounter, or the throwaway remark. Take for instance the Omagh bomb in 1998. It is not widely known, but the 700 pound car bomb left by the Real IRA, was parked directly and one must assume deliberately, outside the premises of a prominent Unionist, who had previously escaped attempts by the IRA to assassinate him on no less than - four previous occasions. A fairly obvious magnet for a bomb in Omagh one would have thought. The RUC evidently didn't think so. Neither did they act on the warning given, later putting their failure to to do so (as on many other occasions) to its 'imprecise nature'. So the RUC did not clear the area in the vicinity of the premises targeted, rather, it was more or less directly outside it ,the RUC instructed pedestrians to stand - for safety. Curiously, of the 29 people killed not one was a member of the RUC.

Then there was the incident, during the Drumcree standoff in July 1998, when quite by chance the BBC's Peter Taylor came across a most revealing encounter in a hotel foyer, featuring notorious UVF and MI5 assassin Billy Wright, and MP and soon to be UUP leader David Trimble. What to Taylor seemed most peculiar was not the so much the public nature of the meeting between the terrorist King Rat and his constituency MP Trimble, but the extraordinary body language of the men. Incredibly it appeared to Taylor, it was not Billy Wright but the - Nobel Peace Prize winning Q.C. - who was adopting the demeanor of deferential junior partner. A relationship, which when you think about it, could surely only exist if both were in agreement on the political fundamentals. In its own small way, it said a much as one needed to know about the prospects for the democratization of a six county statelet. Putting it bluntly, unionism and democracy are totally irreconcilable.

More recently, following the arrest of three republicans in Columbia, the ubiquitous 'security source' remarked that the arrests of the three alleged IRA members proved "the securocrats were right all along [and Blair wrong] on IRA intentions". Perhaps, but what that comment also unequivocally demonstrated is that at the very least, a significant section of the high command of the security services were, as republicans had long maintained, very seriously at odds with their political masters over the conduct, direction, and in truth the peace process itself.

An insight, that makes the revelations emerging about Omagh at least concievable. What so far has been established to the satisfaction of a Guardian investigation, is that the RUC were warned by a double agent within the Real IRA, working for RUC intelligence that 'something big was on' - a full two days before the bomb went off. This informant, using the name Kevin Fulton, even handed over the name and car number of the principle suspect. It is further suggested that yet - another- double agent working for another branch of the British war machine - actually constructed the bomb. Indeed the other agent may actually have been the suspect fingered by Fulton. "Preposterous" RUC chief Ronnie Flanagan said. "She hasn't a clue" former B special Ken, now Lord Maginness declared when Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan announced she was going to investigate the original claim. Almost to a man Ulster MP's denounced the proposed investigation as "absolutely scurrilous", a stance if adopted by anyone other than unionists would have had them screaming; "soft on terrorism", from the rooftops. Yet writing in Irish News on August 23 columnist Jude Collins states: "The first person I heard suggesting that the police knew about the Omagh bomb in advance was a unionist politician, a couple of years ago. It wasn't uncommon, he explained for the police or the army to let occasional attacks happen to protect police informers and agents. Shortly after, a nationalist politician and a second unionist politician confirmed this chilling view of security here. Muddies the good vs bad picture a bit doesn't it?"

More than a bit actually, as it opens up the possibility, that instead of just letting the occasional attack happen, the 'good guys' may also on occasion, in the best possible political taste of course, be tempted to set the odd ‘spectacular’ up.

Certainly it has never been adequately explained why the Real IRA would have targeted Omagh in the first place. For one thing the town is majority nationalist, with SF the biggest party on the local council. That in itself may have been provocation enough, as from the outset it was recognized in republican circles as an attack on the peace process, and the Republican leadership itself. One reason why when invited by British reporters to condemn the slaughter, to the media's surprise and no little disappointment, leading republicans did so with conviction and without caveat.

Adams had publicly stated, following a previous suspisciously timed explosion, that the bombers were working to a British securocrat agenda. Working to a securocrat agenda was of course the same as insisting the bombers were British agents per se.

Nevertheless, in a television interview in August, a ‘former’ British agent, using the name Michael Clarke indicated that a failure to stop the Omagh bomb maker points to a mole within the dissident grouping. "It makes perfect sense for the army or the intelligence services to allow the progress and delivery of a device of some nature to preserve and protect the safety of an agent he told Channel Four News. I believe that's possibly the case." The Republican News take on the same interview saw Clarke’s involvement as far more intimate: "nothing was done" about the Fulton warning because " he [Clarke] had warned British MOD that any action might jeopardize another undercover operative" (23.8.01)

Now the catalogue of collusion between Army, RUC, M15, and loyalists is lengthy and grisly. Few doubt for instance, Billy Wrights or Johnny Adairs links with the spooks. One commentator remarked that it was well known that the securocrats worked the UDA's C Company, which is controlled by Adair "like a foot pedal". Yet in a war against a common enemy, such realpolitik is hardly surprising

Except that up until the belated British recognition of the collapse of the UDA/LVF cease-fire there was supposedly - no war. It is ironically opposition to the peace process that has pulled the threads together. Today the Real IRA, the securocrats, and the UFF/LVF openly share a strategic enemy. And since the 1994 IRA cease-fire the same goal - the destruction of the SF sponsored peace process.

It is therefore not inconceivable that the manipulative relationship the UDA 'enjoys' with the security forces is matched by similar ‘sympathy’ for the absolutists on the other side of the divide. Even a south London street trader like Delboy would recognise the inherent logic: 'You know it makes sense Rodders'. If true, it would help explain the extraordinary coverage the Ealing bomb received. Here was a bomb that for a few days in August, almost rivaled the front-page news coverage of the World Trade Centre atrocity in September. Along with the screaming front-page headlines, there was of course the compulsory ‘expert’ analysis and editorial comment.

In an attempt to add some gravitas, 'Ealing could have been another Omagh' was much-used. Even the Sun broke with tradition and led with a political 'Bombers are Back!' headline. Over-reaching absurdly, RUC chief Ronnie Flanagan went as far as to claim the Real IRA was now more “impressive at this stage of its development” that the Provisional IRA had been in the early 1970's.

Then, gradually and discreetly, it trickled out that the Ealing bomb was nothing like Omagh. It was actually a tiny explosive charge, possibly as little as 5 kilos, making Omagh some 140 times bigger. Moreover the bulk of the Ealing bomb was made up, not of Semtex but - petrol. As a result there was no structural damage to the nearest buildings, nobody suffered ear damage as a result of the blast, and most significantly of all a man captured on a CCTV camera walking within yards of the explosion was not even blown off his feet.

Less partisan experts finally concluded that the timing and placement of the bomb was aimed solely at providing good quality footage for - the British media. And the media, presumably with a little encouragement, reciprocated. In any event from a Real IRA/Securocrat perspective 'Ealing' was a propaganda extravaganza. Understandably, the hype was enthusiastically, if a little inconsistently exploited by anti-GFA politicians of all shades. A line popular in the immediate aftermath, was to suggest that the bombing was triggered with the connivance of the SF/IRA thus breaching the cease-fire, while at the same time others were insisting that there was ‘little point negotiating with the Provos if the dissidents now enjoyed the greater capacity’.

To a refusenik, all were agreed that with terrorism at such 'a near all time high', any talk of reforming the RUC, much less demilitarisation would have to be put on hold. Boldly the UUP's Jeffrey Donaldson stated that what was needed now was - 'more troops not less!'

Hardly an encouragement to the IRA Army Council to make some gesture on decommissioning that the UUP, and in particularly Donaldson had been most vociferous in demanding only days before. When the IRA offer of August 8 was articulated, it was instantly rejected with Donaldson adding surreal pre-conditions. Any future decommisioning would need to be supervised by ‘responsible’ Unionist politicians including, he declared, himself.

Back in the real world, the London Evening Standard, a sister paper of the right-wing Daily Mail described the political situation as nothing less than "desperate". "Sinn Fein" it declared "was close to final victory which means the expulsion of the British from Northern Ireland." The IRA knows, it went on, "how empty are the Government's protestations of determination to see the struggle through, when in truth Mr. Blair would lead the British out tomorrow if he could."

Steadfastly defeatist, it further suggested Unionists "correctly perceive that once Ulster stops being a Protestant Statelet it is well down the track to becoming part of a united Ireland. The Unionists political assessment is hard to fault. Most decent people find it hard to take the spectacle of Sinn Fein and the IRA close to triumph. But that is where we now are." (9.8.2001)

Addressing the same theme in the Guardian the following day, Beatrix Campbell saw the possibility of the deal struck between London and Dublin in a similarly apocalyptic light. "Politically what it [the London-Dublin agreement] does - if the British government doesn't back off - is to position the British government where it never wanted to be: no longer the neutral broker trying to make the Paddies behave, but as a player in the past conflict, a subject as well as agent of change."

Being formally recognized as 'a player' would, if decommissioning continued to be regarded as a central Unionist demand, result in an equivalence being drawn not between the IRA and say the UFF as Unionists had always imagined, but would instead under the new dispensation, regard any trade off as a quid pro quo, between the two primary antagonists - the IRA and the British Army. An appalling vista sufficient to make even the most moderate Unionist gag.

As a representative of a beleaguered minority within Unionism, 'poor David' is kindly regarded in media circles as the epitome of moderation. But the evidence to support their judgment is scant. ‘Trimble the moderate’ has personally caused the institutions set up as part of GFA, and voted on, in what was effectively an all-Ireland referendum - to collapse - if the next impending deadline of November 3rd is included, on no less than four occassions in just over eighteen months. Too impatient to wait even for this deadline, Trimble has now totally retreated from a position of any power sharing with republicanism, returning the UUP along with the DUP to the absolutist position unionism held prior to the GFA, and in essence prior to 1969. What kind of democratic is that?

On the First Ministers own admission the current crisis can hardly be regarded as accidental or unforeseen either. Patently, it is all part of a Machiavellian plot to renegotiate the GFA on unionist terms. For in a letter circulated to the ruling Unionist body, before a key meeting convened almost a year to the day on October 27 2000, he outlined the strategy of which the essentials were, are; to create such a crisis, blame republicans, achieve suspension and tear up the Agreement.

In the letter Trimble pre-empted the events of the last few months since his resignation: "Tomorrow, I will outline a carefully considered response should republicanism continue to ignore its commitments of disarmament" he wrote. "The response is intended to increase pressure progressively on republican and nationalists. This might result in crisis for the Assembly and Executive. But if that arises we must do all we possibly can to place responsibility on republicans only in that way can suspension be achieved. Suspension is preferable to collapse, for it is the only way we can make progress afterwards."

Accordingly, when asked to comment just minutes after the IRA's unprecedented decommissioning offer of Augest 8, he reacted as if kicked: 'Yes, yes, that's all very well but there are other issues such as ...ahm ...policing...'

It would not take a detective of Sherlock Holmes acute observation to divine the glaringly obvious political cynicism behind the remark. If there was any doubt as to his lack of sincerity Trimble went one better on October 8 2001, when citing his abhorrence for all paramilitary weapons he enlisted the UVF-linked Progressive Unionist Party representatives, to table a motion calling for Sinn Fein (the biggest nationalist party) to be excluded due the a failure of the IRA to surrender its weapons! Clearly for 'Trimble the moderate' it is not republicans minus guns in the Executive, but the Executive minus republicans that remains the goal. For as all are aware and as the Evening Standard admitted unless the Six-Counties visibly remains a Protestant Statelet for a Protestant people, unionism is finished.

Understandably, the ground had to be prepared for the acceptance of a return to the demonisation and isolation of Republicanism. A shade too conveniently the FARC - IRA story presented the opportunity for the massed ranks of anti-Republicans to hit the ground running. The IRA were training the Colombians in exchange for drugs, both were working on a 'nuclear bomb' capable of 'vaporizing entire British cities', and perhaps more unbelievably, FARC were supposedly training the IRA on how to - make bombs!

In tandem every utterance of the Colombian regime, which has been condemned by Amnesty, Human Right Watch, and even the United Nations for its role in the formation of pro-state paramilitaries who have murdered thousands of opponents in the past decade, was treated as gospel. Of the Colombian arrests Trimble commented that republicans had "a mountain to climb" to regain the confidence of other parties. Since the World Trade Centre and the announcement of the ‘war against terrorism’ this metaphorical mountain has happily been identified to republicans as K2.

Of the repeated breaches in the UDA cease-fire, or the over 250 documented attacks by the UDA against Catholics in recent months, or the 15,000 UDA marching in military formation in mid-August, or of the civil rights symbolism surrounding the Holy Cross school, Trimble has made no comment. But then comment is unnecessary.

On the isolation front, the SDLP weighed in not once but twice; first demanding SF 'clarification' on Columbia, (even the language is imitative) and then lining up with Unionism in accepting the Pattenlite proposals on policing. Opportunist it maybe, but it could very well prove the last throw of the dice for the SDLP. The SDLP is an ageing party with an ageing constituency. It is something the resignation of Hume and Mallon will not correct. A recent study shows that of the 80,000 nationalists who have become voters since 1992 the vast majority, of all classes, voted SF. Having as it will have to, apologize for each and every RUC outrage from now on, the attempt to isolate republicanism can only hasten the Stoop Down Low Party's own isolation within nationalism. More bleakly for the 'stoops', despite the current impasses, events increasingly are being viewed from an all-Ireland perspective anyway. Which makes a political formation like the SDLP, restricted as it is to the Six Counties, look stale, out of touch, and anachronistic. And if this is true of the SDLP, Unionism stands equally exposed as anachronistic ideology, beached and friendless in the world.

Within SDLP calculations by embracing the RUC, it had hoped it would also lock itself into a concordat with the UPP. Which might have worked had Trimble ever been committed to the type of power sharing that democracy might demand, but unionism could not survive. So with that in mind, for the purposes of renegotiation, Trimble’s partner of choice is far more likely to be Paisley, rather than Mark Durkan, Hume's succesor.

Overwhelmingly British commentators, on both right and left, saw the Good Friday Agreement as a compromise necessary to accommodate Republicanism. With hindsight, it is evident it was largely constructed to accommodate a unionism - with nowhere else to go. Now the mass grave in Manhattan is no ‘trifle’ but neither it nor ‘a war against terrorism’ can hope, no matter how exquisite Unionist positional sense, to in anyway alter so ‘elementary’ a reality.

19th Oct '01

'Nice To Be Back On The Winning Side'

'Sinn Fein are turning out the vote with almost military precision' commentators warned in the run up to Michelle Gildernew's victory in Bobby Sands old seat of Fermanagh and south Tyrone. What do you mean 'almost'? A. Shaw reports.

One of the factors that makes SF so electorally compelling is the knowledge that so many of those of formidable military reputations; 'players' in Brit-speak, are being firmly integrated within the political structures. People like Gerry Hanratty, 'Flash' McVeigh, Gerry McGeough are visibly all putting their shoulders to the wheel.

In north Belfast, it was Bic MacFarlane (OC in the Kesh during the hunger strikes) who along with Gerry Kelly had led the breakout from the Maze in 1983, who in the recent general election helped Kelly, now SF candidate, add another 25% to his total from 1997. In the 26 Counties, McGeough was coordinator of the successful No vote to the Nice treaty. While in Derry, the current mayor, SF's Cathal Crumley, actually served fourteen years for bombing the - town hall!

The thinking behind the transference was explained by Martina Anderson, in an article in Republican News last month, Anderson, who herself served thirteen years wrote: "those who tell us about being more of 'a military man' have become mere spectators during one of the most important periods in our struggle. I can tell you that the burden of responsibility on the majority of us who are actively pursuing this phase is much greater than the risks I took that ended me up in prison."

But what does tactical transition from guerrilla fighter to community rep mean in practical terms?

Well in the first place, for anyone who knows of the demeanour of politicians in the south of Ireland, the contrast with individuals who exude charisma, dynamism and more than anything, incorruptibility, could hardly find a greater contrast with the venality which motivates and permeates all aspects of government thinking in the 26 Counties.

The upshot, as bitter Republican foe Ruth 'Deadly Dudley' Edwards concedes, is that in the eyes of the voters, "Sinn Fein is cool; Sinn Fein is sexy; Sinn Fein is energetic, Sinn Fein is the future." Of course, she also adds that the Shinners are "fascist", thus attempting to convey the notion that the enterprise is driven by a ultra-nationalistic messianic zeal. It is true that SF are a nationalist party, and the only all-Ireland party, which lends its ambition to forge a 32 county Ireland a certain logic. However the real secret to Sinn Fein success - is that there is no secret. What to ambition, vision, and dedication, they have added are the two other prerequisites to success in the field of radical change; hard work, backed up by numbers.

Take North Belfast for instance. In that area alone in addition to Assembly member Gerry Kelly, SF have four councillors, run four advice centres, have eight cumann (branches) and hundreds of committed activists who work all year round. In Newry/Armagh the area is serviced by no less than 19 cumann.

In providing this constituency service in terms of advice and advocacy work, the party is perfectly placed to build up its political intelligence profile on the constituency for electoral purposes. In addition to the standard donation from the salaries of Assembly members Conor Murphy and PatMcnamee, which was used to set up offices in Camlough and Armagh, the party from it's own resources, has opened new offices in Keady, Crossmaglen and Newry. The SDLP by contrast have a full-time office in Newry (donated by a local businessman) and a part-time office recently opened in Armagh.

Whereas during the recent election the SF team did three canvasses of the area, the SDLP had little in terms of campaign workers and were forced to hire a PR firm from the south to put up posters and deliver election material. Sinn Fein on the other hand had "hundreds" of cars to go out and lift Sinn Fein votes on the day itself. In the final few hours a fleet of 'Sinnfeinmobiles' would have scoured designated areas "knocking on doors" as one put it "like demented Mormons". 'To get the Brits out you have to get the vote out'.

Newry/Armagh is, remember, the seat of senior SDLP member and deputy to the first Minister, Seamus Mallon. The result? Mallon: 20,784; Conor Murphy, described as 'little known': 17,209. "That struggle was perhaps" as one reporter put it" the SDLP's nadir - worse even than Brid Rogers defeat." Why? They kept the seat didn't they? Yes, but for how long? For what is noticeably happening now is that as well as attracting new voters and previously non-voters, SF is also noticeably eating, for the first time, into the core SDLP support. Mallons' vote was down by almost 6% while Sinn Feins' was up nearly 10%. With less than 7% now separating the parties, what odds SF taking it next time round? Conor Murphy, lest you assume otherwise, is another former 'military man', who spent almost a decade in prison for the cause.

With the dust settled, not only had SF edged past the SDLP to become the largest nationalist party but with 21.7% of the North's vote Sinn Fein is now within five points of overtaking the UUP as the largest political party in the Six counties.

In some ways the SF role in the Nice referendum is even more significant. There, SF and allies, faced a united front of all the major political parties and - won. In political terms the 'constituencies where Nice was most roundly rejected were almost without exception those where the Sinn Fein analysis, delivered by an indefatigable team of local activists, has been attracting votes for years.' One such area was Kerry North 60.6% 'NOs'. It is here, alleged IRA Army Council stalwart Martin Ferris is expected to take a seat next time. The highest no vote was Dublin South- West where a Republican TD now seems but a matter of time.

In other arenas too, the Republicans have boxed in their opponents. Unionism at one time thought it could exploit decomissioning to exclude Sinn Fein. Then when in chagrin it collapsed the Assembly it served only to confirm the republican argument that 'Northern Ireland' is an untenable entity. In nationalist eyes, far from undermining support for Sinn Fein, this reality merely damaged the credibility of UUP partners, the moderate SDLP. As Malachai O'Doherty puts it: "The broad unionist plan now, to bring down the Executive for want of decomissioning can only bring closer the day when unionists have only Sinn Fein to barter with. While there is an Assembly there is at least a forum, in which the SDLP is still the larger nationalist party. The possibility of them being overtaken by Republicans there was not considered conceivable before 2003. It has already happened, and unionists are pursuing a strategy which could force an election to the Assembly in the autumn, in which Peter Robinson [DUP] may be elected First Minister with Gerry Adams as his deputy." Bad enough from their point of view, having a former IRA Belfast commander as deputy, but as O'Doherty points out "if unionism is fragmented, Adams may be First Minister"!

Currently the UUP have six MP's, Paisley's hardline DUP five, with SF on four. Typically, British commentators have tended to cast the growth of the DUP and SF as a sign of a growing polarisation within the Six Counties, but doing so, only by ignoring the fact that while the DUP are foam-flecked anti-Good Friday Agreement die-hards, SF is it's most sincerely committed advocate. Hardly surprising when the peace strategy, is in all its essential detail a republican construct.

Which is why when a reporter for Radio Five Live asked Adams if he was worried by the surge in support for the DUP, and the problems he might have in dealing with them, he just laughed: "I'm not worried. It's Tony Blair that will have to deal with them." Seeing the reporters confusion he added "These people want to ban line-dancing! - It's Tony Blair who should be worried."

An undeniably dynamic party, SF is also a progressive party. The avowed goal remains a 32 County Socialist Republic. More than anything it is from top to bottom a - working class party. An all round combination which makes it a 'sexy' party. It is also deemed 'cool' in a Europe ,where such soubriquets are generally associated with the likes of Haider, Fini and the far-right.

Writing in The Sunday Telegraph on July 1, even an obsessive adversary like journalist Kevin Myers, is forced, through gritted teeth admittedly, to recognise that "Sinn Fein-IRA is intellectually superior to most of their political opponents" and so for them "the peace process is a mere tactic within a strategy which has prepared for all possible contingencies." So while on one level, SF eclipse of the SDLP represents a strategic electoral victory; a fitting tribute to the military men and their flying machine, in the context of the times and of Europe, it is a working class victory. And for that alone, it is a victory in which we can all share.

While in no way denying, that like military strategies, electoral strategies can exact a high political price, for now at least, it's just nice to be back on the winning side.

Reproduced from RA Bulletin Volume 4, Issue 12, July/Aug '01

Growing Pains

SINN FEIN - A PARTY IN TRANSITION

“Cool judgement says the far Right is not on the march across Europe. Extreme Right parties do not exist, in for example Ireland and Iceland and are irrelevant in Greece and Spain” so Cas Mudde a lecturer at Edinburgh University informed and reassured Guardian readers a few days after both Belgium and Norway lent an ear to the siren call of the Right. Whatever the significance of the absence of the far Right in Iceland their absence in Ireland is easily cleared up. To begin with, very public attempts circa 1997 to set up just such a party were crushed by a combination of Anti-Fascist Action in Ireland, and physical backing from elements within Sinn Fein (SF).

Second, the political vacuum in all other countries not mentioned in Mr Mudde’s analysis, is being filled in Ireland by SF itself. In doing so, SF are breaking the mould. As important therefore as that reality is a study of how they are doing it.

Prior to the Hunger strikes in 1981 the Republican Movement had no electoral profile anywhere in the country. This was corrected in a strategy assessment shortly afterwards. In 1983 Alex Maskey won their first council seat in West Belfast. For the next decade the electoral concentration was conducted exclusively within a Six Counties context. Unsurprisingly, British occupation, the border, and the war dominated what was a revolutionary nationalist programme and agenda.

Despite understandable set-backs Republicans, to the chagrin of both the SDLP and Unionism, gradually began to make their political presence felt at a community level. This growing electoral appeal and ambition was significantly boosted by the implementation of their peace strategy which resulted in the IRA cease-fire in 1994.

From then on while SF have continued to make ground on the SDLP in the north, the real arena of struggle is opening up in the south. As the only all-Ireland party, the marketing advantage this allows SF in contesting elections on any part of the island is immeasurable. A fact acknowledged by pundits in the 26 counties whose predictions have given the more established parties kittens since SF took over 60 local and district seats in elections in 1998. More recently an opinion poll rating gave Gerry Adams a 67% approval rating. In the furore, what has practically gone unnoticed is that SF is changing. This is reflected in the increasing emphasis on the social over the national, and as a consequence on the composition of the membership. The fact is, SF is in transition even as it advances. That it is able to do this, is in part a subliminal recognition by much of its potential support that the war for national liberation and the struggle for sovereignty is as good as won. Thus in adapting to the new reality (it itself created) SF is gradually shedding a revolutionary nationalist skin, in favour of a radical working class socialist one. This has not been without some shedding of membership as well.

The recent rounds of selection conventions around the country have shown the continuing process of development within SF and the movement generally. In rapidly developing areas of growth for SF both on the A list, ie. very winnable seats at the next election and their B list, of possibilities to become very winnable in five years time, there have been bitter battles. Basically new people and new thinking is pushing SF forward in the 26 counties. Those we have met who are doing the pushing, are clear on SF’s socialism and on the need for the party to have deep roots sunk through community activism. Wherever SF had a toehold in a community 2 years ago. they now have a large base.Two or three people struggling for years, now have 30 plus people organised in 3 or 4 cumman (branches). How?

One, through the collapse of the working class and youth vote for all the other parties and two, due to their own determination to do serious consultant work in communities. Councillors will be secured in very large numbers in the next couple of years, something that is largely overlooked when people are focussing on growth at a TD and parliamentary level only. At the same time in many areas the movement has continued to be dominated by veterans of the ‘Border campaign’, many of whom have remained oblivious to all political developments in the last 20 years, and who now that public representatives are being secured, see themselves as much more suitable. and moreover, see the newer elements as wholly unsuitable.

Many of these individuals have started to resurface, joining the newly formed cumann, where many in the past have been the lone SF voice in the area. Sometimes, even as elected councillors they find a newly invigorated SF cumann hard to deal with. In a recent dispute in Wexford where a young local councillor was selected, another councillor and 15 to 20 ‘old guard’ walked out of the convention. These individuals are generally speaking representative of a layer who should have left in 1986 (in the split led by Ruari O Bradaigh) had there been anyone locally to take them. They are oblivious to SF’s social programme, and overly concerned with how people stand to attention for the national anthem, how the flag is presented at meetings and so on!

These tensions have been mirrored across a number of the key seats, and coming on the back of defections to the 32 County Sovereignty grouping (and mirroring the same backward thinking) the outcome of such disputes are extremely significant. As things stand they show a movement in a state of flux, a movement with enormous potential but not yet having completed the process of transition. Despite this, SF have the potential not only to be a beacon of hope in Ireland, but as importantly a beacon of hope in Europe.          

J. McNamara

Reproduced from RA vol 4, Issue 9, November/December '00

What Is To Be Done?

Steve Potts reviews the first edition of Fourthwrite, the new journal of the Irish Republican Writers Group
 
The IRWG describes itself as “small in number, an amalgamation of people inclined towards radical politics, including both those who oppose the Belfast Agreement and those who support it” defining its aims as facilitating the “discussion and analysis of republican ideas. Of primary interest are those ideas which deal with strategic matters and which address the question ‘what is to be done?”
Edited by ex-republican prisoner Anthony McIntyre, the contributors to issue one include two of the 1980 hunger­strikers, Brendan Hughes and Tommy McKearney, who was also one of the founders of the League of Communist Republicans in Long Kesh during the mid-eighties. And in emphasising an open approach to debate, what it calls “Wolftone’s philosophy of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter”, Fourthwrite also contains an article by Unionist and David Trimble advisor, Steven King.
What sets it apart from other publications critical of the Provisional movement’s strategy is that it avoids the crude analysis of sell-out parroted by those on the left or the simplistic doctrine of ‘back to war’ that often appears the sum total of strategic thinking amongst the various republican splinter groups. As Tommy McKearney states in the opening article ‘Republicanism in the 21st Century’, “others think that supporting armed struggle is of itself somehow the essence of republican fidelity”, whereas correctly, McKearney makes the point that “[republicanism] must be a living, vibrant philosophy or it becomes a stagnant mantra”.
So what does Fourthwrite offer us instead? The central thrust coming from the main contributors runs something like this: ‘that the peace process has enabled the British and Free State governments to successfully integrate republican revolutionaries into establishment politics. That far from Sinn Fein changing the system, the system will actually change Sinn Fein, with pragmatic accommodation replacing cherished principles. That Sinn Fein is now treading the same, well-worn path taken by the Workers Party during the ’70s when what was being offered from the Brits then was no worse than what is on offer now, and certainty wasn’t worth a further 20 years of war. That SF has become little more than an electoral machine, which has begun attracting the nationalist middle classes and is creating a class of professional, republican, politicians, from the Brits’ funding of numerous community projects, even to the point where some stand to gain personally from these. That the traditional loyalty to the republican movement, crucial during the war years, is now being exploited by the leadership to stifle genuine debate’.
Undoubtedly the rapid growth of SF will attract ambitious members of the nationalist middle classes who, while conspicuous by their absence during the war years, will be quick to recognise that SF is fast becoming a force to be reckoned with, north and south. Already the speculation in the media is more about when rather than if SF will enter into coalition government in the south. Certainly SF is not, nor would it claim to be, a communist party, the republican movement is a broad church, incorporating elements of both radical and conservative Irish nationalism. The road ahead is full of dangers and there are no divine guarantees they won’t be sucked-in by the old order, forced to compromise their principles, until their principles become meaningless in the same way many argue has already happened to the ANC.
At least for the moment though, this remains purely conjecture. SF are probably the only progressive political party in the whole of Western Europe that can boast a leadership, membership and support base made-up overwhelmingly from the working class. It has taken up and campaigned on social issues with vigour, winning it support not just in what the media like to call, ‘the ghettoes’ of the Bogside and Ballymurphy, but across whole areas of Ireland. It is also at the cutting edge of new thinking amongst working class communities, the Community Restorative Justice initiatives, are clear evidence of that.
What really stands out from the first edition of Fourthwrite, however, is not the strengths or weaknesses of the analysis offered (that will depend on your own viewpoint, and Red Action’s own thinking on the Peace Process will be familiar to any of our regular readers), but the stark fact that not once amongst the eleven main contributions does anyone seriously attempt to answer the question, ‘what is to be done instead?’ Only when this matter is properly addressed might Fourthwrite become part of the ‘must have’ set.
To obtain a copy of Fourthwrite, to contact the IRWG, or submit an article, write to: Fourthwrite © P0 Box 31, Belfast, BT12 7EE
email: Mackersl@cableolco.uk 
website:http://homepage.eircom.net/~repwrite

Feile an Phobail '99

Steve Potts reports on this year's Red Action delegation to Feile an Phobail, the West Belfast Festival.With the majority over for the first time, this was the biggest and most politically rewarding for many years.

Established in 1988, Feile is the largest community festival in Europe. The main festival celebrations are timed to take place around the anniversary of the introduction of internment - the 9th of August, 1971. The injustice of internment was marked in subsequent years by street disturbances. Feile was intended to replace this with a time of creative expression for the people of West Belfast.

Most members of the RA delegation arrived early Friday afternoon, and were taken straight from the airport to the famous (or infamous according to the security forces) Felons club on the Falls Road, home of the Irish Republican Felons Association. As its name suggests, membership of the Felons is open only to those who have served time for the Republican cause and counts Nelson Mandela amongst its honourary members. Originally set up by Gerry Adams Snr in the 1940's, the club is presently at the centre of a concerted attempt by the RUC to have it closed down.

Every year the club hosts 'Prisoners Day', to coincide with activities arranged by prisoners inside the jails during Festival week. This year the main theme was the 1981 Hunger Strike exhibition and also included a display of Republican prisoners' handicrafts and artwork. In a packed main hall there then followed an emotional launch of a new book about Tom Williams, EXECUTED Tom Williams and the IRA, who at the age of 18 was hung in 1942. In the presence of Joe Cahill and John Oliver, themselves originally sentenced to death with Williams, it was introduced by its author, serving Republican prisoner Jim McVeigh, who was on leave for the weekend.

After this powerful opening to the weekend the delegation headed for their billets in New Barnsley and Turf Lodge, in West Belfast and the Lower Ormeau, in the South of the City. A raucous evening followed with entertainment provided by Glasgow's Eire Og at the Sloanes club at the Whiterock.

Bright and early next morning the delegation gathered at Milltown Cemetery for a tour which profiled some of the approximately 120 Republican volunteers and activists from Belfast who had given their lives during the last 30 years of war and who had been buried at this historical site. These included the Gibraltar 3 and the Belfast hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, Joe McDonnell and Kieran Doherty. The guide read some passages from Sands' diary and pointed out the sometimes forgotten fact that had they not put themselves forward for hunger-strike, all ten, bar Francis Hughes, would have been released from prison by 1987. Attempting to place the esteem that republican dead are held in by the local community, the guide asked those assembled if they could remember a single name of a British soldier who had been killed during the 'troubles', or the location of a single public memorial. No one could. The tour also took in the burial plots of both the INLA and the Official IRA volunteers and profiled Joe McCann, Ronnie Bunting and 'Ta' Power amongst others.

Immediately after the tour the delegation travelled to the newly opened Sinn Fein (SF) centre on the Lower Ormeau Road for a meeting with SF councillor Sean Hayes and two of his colleagues. The Lower Ormeau nationalists are a relatively new community in Belfast and have been the target of a concerted campaign of loyalist violence, peaking with the infamous Sean Graham's bookies shop massacre. The area has also been the scene of recent state violence as the RUC have forced through a number of unwanted Orange parades.

The meeting which lasted for over two hours and centred around RA members obtaining an insight into the building of SF electorally and in particular it's successful development of working class community politics. Despite a host of useful advice, to a man the SF members were at pains to stress that at the end of the day what is required for success, was hard work and commitment; it had for instance taken them 10 years for them to take a single seat in the Lower Ormeau.

There was also a look into the new Community Restorative Justice schemes being pioneered in the North, before the meeting finally had to be brought to a close.

That evening RA members attended the controversial play, Forced Upon Us, by Dubblejoint Productions made up of local and professional actors, including ex-prisoners. The play, which is a dramatic argument about the history and experiences that lie behind the call for the RUC to disband had had its funding withdrawn by the arts board, on the grounds that it was lacking in artistic merit. In typical fashion the local community responded, packing out every performance.

Sunday was the delegation's final day in Belfast, which began with the thousands strong annual march and rally to the City Centre to commemorate the introduction of internment. Followed almost immediately by a tour of the tiny nationalist enclave of Short Strand in east Belfast. The historical, political, social, economic and cultural background of the area was outlined by a local republican activist.

The last formal event of the weekend was a presentation to an ex- republican prisoner and his family from West Belfast. This family have welcomed our members, supporters and contacts into their home, sometimes with little or no warning, for over a decade. Presenting them with a set of framed prints from the Spanish Civil War, a RA organiser pointed out that "while it is often said that Red Action never forgets who our enemies are, we certainly never forget who our friends are either". The opportunity was also taken to thank the organisers of the delegation, Matt and Tommo, who had put in a lot of hard work to ensure that this years delegation to Belfast was one of the most politically successful in our organisations history.

Red Action would like to thank the Republican communities of Belfast for the hospitality and generosity shown to our delegation during the Festival weekend.

Reproduced from RA Vol 4, Issue 3, Oct/Nov '99

Waging Peace

While for all the obvious reasons the IRA matters, A. Shaw explains why Sinn Fein is the new power house in the partnership - at least for now.

"A beaver with a new tooth brush" was how someone described hardline Unionist Jeffrey Donaldson as the clock ticked down on yet another absolute deadline while in the background Blair was telling anyone prepared to listen "that there was no Plan B". Similar displays of giddiness at just such a prospect were apparent in media liberals Trimble and Maginnis, unwittingly captured live on Newsnight guffawing loudly, seconds before solemnly announcing 'on air ' that agreement was impossible due to SF/IRA intransigence.

The following day Tony Blair toured Stormont declaring that there had been a "seismic shift" in Sinn Fein thinking. To which his old friend David Trimble correctly responded: "What fucking seismic shift?" (Sunday Telegraph 4.7.99) His exasperation was unduly vocal given his understanding the game had already been won. Which is to say the status quo prevailed. 'Just say no ' has been mainstream Unionism's negotiating position since 1912, and neither it nor they have moved an inch since. For Unionism life cannot imaginably get any better, so any change is necessarily negative. 'How many Unionists does it take to change a light bulb? ' is the impasse approached from another direction. 'Change? Who said anything about change? '

"Destablising the situation" was of course the instinctive response of Trimble 's predecessor to news of the IRA ceasefire in 1994. So naturally, any concessions real or imaginary, any perceived softening of the SF position during negotiations immediately registered as a threat. And so rather than respond positively Trimble was most concerned with shoring up any possible breach in his defenses, by piling on in the precise areas where SF appeared to be offering concessions further pre-conditions. For fifteen months Unionism has refused to implement any aspects of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) which they had signed up to, so the more the pressure mounted the more monosyllabic the response. More than a touch exasperated Adams repeatedly drew the world media's attention to Unionist body language, explaining that SF proposals to, in the time worn phrase, 'move the situation forward ' were being rejected in minutes by the UUP. And of course the more Republicans "stretched themselves", albeit, and all importantly within the terms of the GFA ( 'SF would encourage the IRA "to dump arms" only in the context of an overall settlement '), the more imminently reasonable appeared the Republican position, the more beleaguered Trimble and his colleagues became. At 4am one morning Trimble was challenged in the corridor by Loyalist stalwart Cedric Wilson who inquired "Are you holding the line on decomissioning?" Trimble answered "I can't find the line." (Scotland on Sunday 4.7.99) Trimble 's colleagues were stunned.

Unionist disarray was understandable. 'A Protestant State for a Protestant people ' cannot credibly survive the idea of unarmed Catholics in power, much less reputed members of the Army Council in the Cabinet. And without Unionism as a centrifugal ideological force, the knot attaching the Six Counties to Britain would likely unravel of it's own accord. A scenario long recognised by the likes of ultra-Unionist Lord Cranbourne, M15, strident editorials in the right-wing press and belatedly the leadership of the Tory party. Ultimately for the right-wing of the establishment and Unionism itself, what matters is not decommisioning but keeping Unionism motivated: that is to say ideologically pure.

A position summarised by a 65 year old Orangeman who stated: "We have already given too much away. Even if they turned up with a truck load of weapons it would not make any difference because they can always get more" (Independent 3.7.99). Which is to say the surrender of weapons would make 'no difference ' to Unionism ever countenancing SF in government. After all whether armed or unarmed an 'unreconstructed ' Republican is still a Republican. Never mind the supposed triumph of ballot box over Armalite, Unionism has "dug in" and all democrats and right thinking people should support them "to prevent" according to former Thatcher adviser Simon Heffer, "criminals and murderers having a share in a constitutional process that they could never obtain other than by force." (Daily Mail 3. 7. 99) Or as another Mail columnist Steven Glover put it, if the outcome of the negotiations is a genuine representative democracy "peace is too high a price to pay".

What a turn up. Throughout the '70s the Union was defended by the pretence that the Republican movement was a criminal conspiracy without public support. A strategy dashed with the election of Bobby Sands in 1981, and the 'Armalite and ballot box ' strategy adopted thereafter. And while the right-wing of the Establishment might like to pretend that SF are in position courtesy only of the IRA, the unpalatable reality is a party which commands over 40% of the nationalist vote in the North and is increasingly being recognised as the radical alternative in the South, enjoys a political mandate created entirely off it 's own efforts.

Moreover, while for all the obvious reasons "the army" certainly matters, "the party" is undeniably the new power house of the Republican movement. So even while the prospects of 'bombs in London ' continue to focus Brit minds wonderfully it is the political strategy which has come closest to breaking the stalemate. By any means, including if necessary, exclusively legal methods is the Republican gameplan that brought Unionism 'trembling ' to the edge of the abyss. "There is one firm rule that governs the political strategy of Sinn Fein/IRA: exhaust the weaponry that you have until the enemy has perfected his defence. Then produce the weapon that negates those defenses... Thus you continuously stretch your enemy, force him on the defensive and maintain the initiative (Daily Telegraph 6.7.99). This according to IRA renegade/M15 spook Sean O'Callaghan is what Republicanism is now doing to Unionism. He explains the modus operandi thus: "if the IRA can fire a large mortar 500 yards and it 's engineers devise one capable of throwing a larger one longer, the improved version is not introduced until the enemy has gone to great lengths to perfect it 's defenses against the (now obsolete) mortar".

Given that it was not uncommon in the late '80s for the Northern Ireland Office to smugly boast of having reduced the terrorist threat to "an acceptable level of violence", ie. perfected their defenses against mortar Mark l (armed struggle) the absolute dismay caused by the introduction of mortar Mark 2 (peace strategy) proved, as was intended, all the more demoralising for the defenders of the status quo.

Certainly if body language, time and effort, u-turns, broken deadlines, broken promises, exaggerations and outright lies is anything to go by, Tony Blair very definitely 'wants out '.

Nothing unique in this of course, British PM 's with various degrees of intensity having been trying to painlessly get out, ie. 'leave without being seen to have left ' for at least 30 years. But having concluded in order to get out mainstream Unionism must be faced down, both he and Bertie Ahern spent the twelve months since the signing of the GFA pandering to Unionism with the pretence the 'just say no ' veto had somehow been incorporated into it. A strategy that succeeded in both confusing an already extremely divided and dysfunctional Unionist family unneccesarily, and rebounded as a self fulfiling prophecy.

A wrong headed approach compounded by the last minute offer of legislation tying decommissioning to the exclusion of SF, which ran against the letter and spirit of GFA, which dismayed nationalism and was predictably rejected as insufficient by Unionism. Then unbelievably, Blair added yet further amendments even after it had been passed by Parliament. (A devastatingly effective guarantee against any future accusations of Machiavellism surely.) At that stage rather than further palliatives, Blair in true statesman like fashion should if he really knew what he was doing, have taken a leaf out of Mo Mowlam 's book, who when tired of being badgered by an incalcerant Paisley told him if he didn't like what was on offer to "fuck off."

Fundamentally, where Blair differs from his Prime Ministerial predecessors like Lloyd George is that the broad strategy initiative he is responding to, and has in his own interests embraced, was never of his own design. When he "says there is no Plan B" it is not hard believe him, as neither he nor indeed Major ever had anything to do with the original Plan A. "The IRA cessation of 1994" had no British sponsorship of any kind, but was as Adams himself made clear "built on the [combined] work of Sinn Fein, John Hume, Albert Reynolds and Irish America" (Guardian 7.7.99). And in that order of merit. So in line with the evolving situation the original architects of Plan A, will be getting ready to introduce Plan B, while at the same studying closely the drawings for Plan C, if not plan D.

Reproduced from RA Vol 4, Issue 2, Aug/Sept '99

Dead Man On Leave

Although the name of Thomas 'Ta' Power is virtually unknown outside of Irish republican circles, Steve Potts explains why he continues, despite his death, to have a profound and lasting effect upon Red Action.

The violent death of over a dozen members of a fraternal organisation would have a profound and lasting effect on anybody. Not least when links built up over the years meant that many involved in the 1987 INLA/IPLO feud were personal friends. When the dust had settled, RA was determined that it at least, should learn the lessons of this tragedy.
Recently circumstances within AFA have pushed these lessons to the fore once again. A campaign of intense vilification by the 'Real AFA', opposed to the AFA policy of fighting fascism politically as well as physically, saw one of their number, (who had some years previously been expelled from AFA) offering to slash a RA member in order to things to a head.
On December 22 1986, when leading Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) member, Thomas 'Ta' Power, was released from jail after the collapse of the Supergrass system, he was, to quote his comrades, "a man on a mission." Ta, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, had used his time in jail to analyse in detail the problems that had dogged the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) through much of it's existence. It would be necessary, he believed, to entirely transform the INLA/IRSP if it was to develop into a genuine revolutionary force. This could only be done he offered, by "confronting the basic contradiction" within the movement. Not to do so, by making only cosmetic changes, would, he argued, result in the same problems simply replicating themselves at a later date. On his release he debated his ideas extensively. He was, as a colleague later commented, "a breath of fresh air, displaying a vitality and zest for the work ahead that served as an inspiration to us all, here was a man with a breadth of vision." Within a month he was dead. Murdered by those opposed to the contradiction being unravelled.
Fortunately, before he was murdered, Ta committed a number of his ideas to paper. His essay, An historical analysis of the IRSP; its past role, root cause of its problems and proposals for the future, was eagerly consumed within RA ranks. Part of the essay referred to the relationship between the INLA & the IRSP. Ta argued that the previous relationship, where the IRSP played junior partner to the INLA, should be reversed: instead the INLA would become the cutting edge of a new, revitalised, revolutionary party. The tail would no longer wag the dog. Under his proposals, all new recruits into the INLA would have first "gone through the training school of building [the political wing]; they will all have this background, with revolutionary politics uppermost, with allegiances to [the party]; with being familiar with all the trends in [the IRSP], with all its problems, personalities, policies - and never 'divorced' from these."
Alternatively as Ta pointed out, "When it's asked: What is the imperialists... policy and how do we aim to thwart this? - we get the same old answer ie. that it's necessary to confront them, that the struggle goes on; we get no analysis, we get no strategy outside the basic confrontation - it simply becomes an end in itself due simply to the fact that they don't know of any other strategy.Other trends manifest themselves due to this for e.g. psychological traits: there arised the condition of elitism, superiority etc, that we're the lads, that this is the real macho way to do things, that those in [the political wing] are wankers, bluffers etc, who always harp on about 'meaningless' things. Therefore there arises a definite trend of spurning [political] type work as being beneath their 'style,' standing etc; there arised a contempt for those involved in [political] type work etc. Another trend arises of prestige building, of wanting to be seen and known as the 'lad' etc. This in turn attracts the ambitious power seeking individual who in turn begins to consolidate his position, to build a power base etc. A lowering of standard eventually comes into being - where criminal type elements, unsavoury characters, inept individuals are allowed entrance and rise to prominence - the result is constant crises, factions, instability, discredit."
Many column inches have been given over in recent editions of Red Action to deal with the debates that have gone on within AFA, but I think Ta Power probably best summed up the 'Real AFA' mindset 12 years ago. Simply replace "imperialists" with "fascists" and I think you have it in a nutshell.
Although in many ways our circumstances differed our high profile involvement in physical action against organised fascist gangs, has meant that we always had to be alert to the danger of people joining RA for the wrong reasons. Of course, we can't expect anyone to join RA as the 'finished article' but RA studiously ensured that the left's much cherished stereotype of the apolitical bootboy, never actually became fact. In practical terms, a motion was put to the 1988 RA conference calling for the formation of a 'Stewards Group' to deal with all matters of our organisations security. Initially there was some opposition. Some members voiced the concern that an 'organisation within an organisation' was being proposed. However, the vote was carried by a large majority, with those in favour arguing that the ad-hoc nature of stewarding at that time could lay it open to the kind of abuse that had been witnessed in the Irish republican socialist movement and that what was required was a stewarding body whose activities could be held directly accountable by the organisation as a whole.
In a rare, insightful moment in an otherwise deeply flawed book Jack Holland and Henry McDonald (INLA - Deadly Divisions) point out that, "Subordinating military struggle to carefully thought-out political strategy had been Ta Power's dream for a long time. In the 1980s Sinn Fein and the IRA made that a reality with their ballot box come armalite policy. The provos learnt well from the lessons and mistakes of the IRSP/INLA." And they weren't the only ones.

Reproduced from RA Vol 3, Issue 6, April/May 1999

The Committee

Sensational claims in 'The Committee - political assasination in Northern Ireland,' that the murder of political opponents were ordered by prominent members of the Unionist establishment led to the book being banned. With the current crisis in the peace process, Lee Stephens highlights the 'inextricable links' between David Trimble and the accused.

David Trimble knew King Rat. They were on speaking terms. Maybe not bosom buddies but certainly closer than in December 1992 when in the House of Commons Trimble described him 'as a gentleman known as Billy Wright... who... 1 am told is a gangster.' The LVF leader was one of Trimbles' Portadown constituents, and so the intimate tete a tete witnessed by the BBC's Peter Taylor in the midst of the 1996 Drumcree standoff might have been considered by many typical of a social encounter between a high profile powerful politician and an unemployed working class man with limited formal education.

Except that while one was assured and confident and the other eager to please and uncomfortable, it was Trimble who was sweating.

Wright was named in McPhilemy's book as a prominent member of 'The Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating Committee' who with others, including a senior Ulster Bank executive; a Presbyterian minister; a prominent solicitor, a staff member at Queen's University and an Ulster Independence Committee member conspired to with RUC/UDR 'inner force' connivance to murder their political opponents. Those listed above were six of the two dozen committee members named by McPhilemy, and Nobel Peace prize winner David Trimble has a direct political connection with all of them. When David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party accepted the Nobel Peace Prize, the world held it's breath, as he proceeded to address his audience with perhaps the most ungracious acceptance speech in the prize's history. Trimble's speech was a concerted attack upon the Republican Movement and a return to the largely irrelevant issue of decommissioning as part of the Unionist's attempt to wreck the peace process from within.

For some time now the Unionist/Loyalist side in the process has required the input of their political equivalent to South Africa's F.W. De Klerk. Someone who recognises that the "jig is up" and who is prepared to negotiate the best possible deal available to that community. Instead they have their own P.W. Botha in the shape of Trimble, stalling and filibustering the entire peace process in order to maintain the status quo.

An analysis of Trimble's political background reveals however that he is pursuing a political line that in his own terms is at least a consistent one. In February 1988, as a law lecturer at Queens University and before commencing his parliamentary career, William David Trimble penned a pamphlet entitled, "What Choice For Ulster". In it Trimble argued that the Anglo Irish Agreement had signalled Britain's intention to withdraw the birthrights of the "Ulster British" and he presented the case for an 'Independent Ulster' as an alternative. Indeed his stated view's on the subject have become the 'blue print' for the most extreme elements of the loyalist community, whose object is to regain exclusive control of the government of the six counties. The establishment of a pro-Independent Ulster bloc in the loyalist community also mirrored the sharp increase in loyalist paramilitary terror attacks carried out against the nationalist community in general and republicans in particular.

This group who saw the Anglo-Irish Accord of 1985 as the final straw in Britain's attempt to sell their birthrights to Dublin, once organised, became increasingly influential in every area of Unionist and Loyalist life. They promoted the idea of a 'Doomsday Scenario' where Ulster would be sold out by the British and that it would therefore be up to the Ulster (Protestant) people to go it alone. Their aim was in effect to create a "junta in waiting" ready to assume leadership of the 'Ulster Nation' when the need arose. In the short term their aim was to deal with the "enemy within,' nationalism and republicanism. Their first step was to reorganise the forces of reaction, the loyalist death squads, the RUC and the UDR, into a co-operative unit which colluded and implemented a military campaign of terror against the Catholic Community. According to James Sands, former member of the 'committee' and chief source of Sean McPhilemy's book: "Before then, Ulster people on the loyalist side were never really organised. There was wee small groups in various towns done their own thing But because of the signing of the agreement in 1985, which brought a lot of middle upper classes into Ulster Loyalism, that these men have, these people have seen that there is a British withdrawal, gradual, but still a withdrawal. And from a business point of view, they want to look after themselves. They don 't want to be left high and dry with the British withdrawal. And they're putting their business expertise, their business knowledge to the good of Ulster.'

So hiding behind the cloak of respectability, some of Northern Ireland's most prominent businessmen, politicians, policemen, lawyers and clergy became directly involved in the loyalist assassination campaign. Their involvement was to provide the loyalists with the money, arms and political direction that they had previously lacked. Loyalist assassins like Billy "King Rat" Wright and Robin "The Jackal" Jackson and their gangs were the hired guns of The Committee, whose access to detailed official files and information, as well as their ability to provide the hands-on involvement of RUC units in death squad murders, was to make them seem virtually untouchable. The conspiracy however goes much deeper than simply providing loyalist nutters with gear and security files. According to McPhilemy's book, the conspiracy goes to the very heart of the Unionist Establishment and involves a secret "inner force" within the RUC, which in turn is run by a core leadership known as the Inner Circle. The Inner Force within the RUC is organised from a divisional level right down to a station by station "cell" structure. McPhilemy also contends that the overall commander of this secret grouping is the ex- Head of RUC Special Branch.

As a result of similar allegations made by McPhilemy in a Channel Four documentary broadcast October 2 1991, a Presbyterian Minister appeared on Right to Reply three days later to refute unfair inferences he believed were contained in the programme. He was accompanied by his MP David Trimble who forcefully and repeatedly insisted thereafter that it was all a 'hoax and republican propaganda.' (When the Sunday Express repeated the hoax accusations outside of Parliament it would eventually cost them a cool £500,000 in damages and costs as a result of losing a libel action brought by McPhilemy in 1996)

That the loyalist assassins became better armed and better informed during the late 1980's and early 1990's cannot be denied. There have always been claims made by the nationalist community that there has been widespread collusion between the state forces and the death squads throughout the present period of conflict. You only have to look at the long list of RUC and UDR/RIR personnel convicted of loyalist terrorist offences to put paid to the lie that the forces of law and order are policing the six counties impartially. Father Raymond Murray's book, The SAS In Ireland, documents the collusion with, and direction of, the loyalist death squads by the British Army's most elite units.

Robin Jackson was one of those so directed. A seasoned 'terrorist' in the true sense and meaning of the word. He was recruited by British Army Intelligence in 1974. They facilitated his activities and, according to McPhilemy's sources, "...trained him in the assassin 's art. '' The former British Intelligence officer, Captain Fred Holroyd, who was himself based in Portadown between 1973 and 1975 has no doubt that Robin Jackson was a "licensed killer" for the "security services." Jackson and Wright were in effect the Committee's hired help, contracted to carry out operations on it's behalf. Jackson's career as a hit-man for the RUC and Army made him an obvious choice to carry out the Committee's "dirty work." Both men enjoyed co-operation from their police and army counterparts and immunity from prosecution. Indeed, not only did they escape prosecution, they could also rely upon the direct involvement of RUC officers in certain operations. In one example, McPhilemy alleges that two on-duty RUC officers belonging to the 'Inner Force' acting on instructions from the Committee, selected a victim by checking the license plate of his car through the RUC computer in order to establish whether he was a Catholic. The two officers then arranged to meet Billy Wright and guide him into the lover's lane where he and his girlfriend had parked the car. This murder, of the young Catholic man, Denis Carville, was a so-called 'revenge attack' for the IRA killing of UDR soldier, Colin McCullough at the same spot. As Jim Sands stated: "They wanted someone who was in the same situation, a young man sitting with his girlfriend in the car. " In light of the sectarian murder of a constituent by Billy Wright, the comment by the local MP for the area, that "some idiot had taken the law into his own hands' was both bizarre and politically loaded. That MP was David Trimble.

Another of the Committee's victims was the leading nationalist defence solicitor in the north of Ireland. Patrick Finucane. The RUC, in particular, deemed that Finucane was basically "a Provo" because he was prepared to act as legal counsel to members of the republican movement. Thus, in February, 1989, Pat Finucane also became a victim of the Committee. Following the C4 screening of The Committee a prominent loyalist solicitor launched proceedings of criminal libel against McPhilemy in December 1992. He sued McPhilemy, claiming that because he could be recognised from the programmes description, he was in a fact being set up for assassination 'and had been placed in a similar position to Pat Finucane.' Precisely because he was personally present in the Finagh Orange Hall in January 1989 when the murder of Finucane was commissioned, this typical display of "chutzpah" according to McPhilemy, drew particular admiration from his loyalist co-conspirators. The claim that he was indeed recognisable was supported by two sponsors: another solicitor, and David Trimble who swore an affidavit stating that he was in "absolutely no doubt" that his friend and had been the solicitor identified. The fellow solicitor, who backed up Trimble, happens to be in legal practice with, according to information supplied to McPhilemy by an informer in 1991, yet a another member of 'The Committee.' It also turns out, that this is the same partner ship that looks after Trimble's legal affairs.

Sometimes in the past evidence of collusion was dismissed as being carried out by rogue elements among the security forces. But, as Sean McPhilemy points out the conspiracy is deep and wide. As well as a former Asst. Chief Constable and the ex-head of RUC Special Branch, McPhilemy names five other senior RUC officers with links to 'The Committee,' plus two Army Majors still serving in the UDR/RIR. Unionist councillors, Presbyterian Ministers, Queen's University academics and a number of solicitors, lawyers and businessmen are also alleged to be full participants in the conspiracy. Unsurprisingly, their influence within the constituency of unionism is pervasive.

In particular the political hand of 'the Committee' can be seen especially around the issue of Drumcree where it has been their political influence, in their own heartland of Portadown, that has been the driving force behind the intransigent position adopted by the local Orangemen. It may have been as a result of the influence of 'the Committee,' along with a mistrust of the local RUC's ability to maintain order, that convinced British direct ruler, Mo Mowlam to call in the Parachute Regiment to bolster the lines at Drumcree last year.Trimble is after all the MP whose constituency takes in Drumcree and the town of Portadown. Portadown is the town at the heart of the Committee's "murder triangle" and Drumcree has become a symbol for the most sectarian Orange elements. Anyone who crossed such individuals may well be taking their own life into their hands - if, that is, they genuinely disagreed politically with The Committee. Trimble's own political background would suggest however that any differences that might exist between him and the members of the Committee is as likely to be one of emphasis and presentation, rather than the ultimate objective. Trimble is, after all, a published exponent of the Committee's preference for an Independent Ulster. In addition when a member of the faculty staff at Queens University in the late '80's, both he and another faculty member sat on the executive of the extreme loyalist Ulster Clubs. The latter would later join the Committee. And when another fellow executive, and uncompromising Loyalist was shot dead by the IRA in1988, his brother a leading Bank executive, and ex RUC officer, responded by draw ing together the Loyalist coalition that would become the The Committee.

In 1991, the former RUC officer, apparently for his own amusement posed as "driver" for the extremely shadowy Ulster Resistance when escorting a Channel Four reporter to an interview.

On the way, the researcher became aware that the driver was being waved through RUC road blocks by officers who appeared deferential towards him. Laughing, the driver turned to the researcher and said: "It makes you wonder who runs this place, doesn't it?"

By his stance on decommissioning, and the tenor of his Oslo acceptance speech, Trimble made it clear that if he wasn't exactly speaking for the people 'who run the place,' he was certainly still speaking to them.

Reproduced from RA Vol 3, Issue 5, February/March 1999

Rebel Music

Steve Potts investigates the growing cottage industry that seeks to profit from the 'peace dividend'.

While in Belfast recently I picked up a CD by Bik McFarlane and Terry O'Neil, Something Inside So Strong. McFarlane, leader of the IRA prisoners in Long Kesh during the '81 hunger-strikes and 'Cruncher' O'Neil, a well known North Belfast republican activist; have produced a mini album with a number of well picked songs including the title track that has become Sinn Feins' unofficial anthem and Song For Marcella, which Bik wrote in jail for his comrade Bobby Sands.

The songs are sung with a heartfelt passion and sincerity with the proceeds being donated 'towards campaigns highlighting the issues of Irish political prisoners of war.' It comes as a breath of fresh air against the backdrop of a boom in the production and sales of 'Irish rebel music' that is fast threatening to become a cottage industry.

Irish people have a long and rich cultural tradition of articulating their struggles through the medium of song, ensuring that their political heritage is passed from generation to generation. This is particularly the case in Glasgow where folk bands performing Irish ballads have played an important role in keeping alive the historical roots of the Irish emigrant population, especially amongst the young people who frequent the bars around Glasgow Celtic football club before and after a game.

Despite it's underground nature and working class audience, the potential has nonetheless always existed for large amounts of money to be made from this scene. In recent years, with the war in Ireland over and CD production technology relatively cheap, the scene has significantly expanded with more and more eager to reap the financial benefit of the 'peace dividend.'

Even long before the peace process had commenced though, a number of republican supporters had begun to express disquiet over the attitude of a number of the bands playing the Glasgow scene. At first this had centred around the issue of the fees charged for benefit functions. During the height of the bombing campaign in London, those working in support of Irish POWs had attempted to organise a benefit social within the 'belly of the beast.' Quotes for bands had varied from between £600 and £800. Charging £5 a ticket, it meant that organisers would have had to get 160 people into the venue before they could even think about raising any money for the prisoners!

Clearly, somewhere along the way the relationship between the bands and the wider struggle had become extremely distorted, to almost perverse proportions.

Afterall, the popularity of Glasgow's Irish bands centred around the fact that they sung about the Irish war, the IRA and it's prisoners. Yet at the same time they expected to be rewarded handsomely for playing in support of that very same cause. Some republican supporters asked why? They did not expect payment for organising or stewarding events. And certainly those in the firing line, the volunteers and POWs whom the ballads are written about, weren't making any money while they risked their lives. Yet many of the bands, who were little more than well-rehearsed covers bands, insisted that they had to be paid; it was afterall, how they made their living.

Finally the Celtic fanzine, Tiocfaidh Ar La, went into print criticising the band 'Athenrye' who had encouraged female members of their audience to come up onto the stage and remove their tops in exchange for a t-shirt. The arrogant and contemptuous response by Athenrye went some way to reveal the size of the egos that were now doing the rounds on the circuit; ironically probably aided by Tiocfaidh Ar La, who had previously dubbed them 'THE NEW IRISH SUPERGROUP' in a genuine attempt to promote the scene.

As questions continued to be asked about the funding of Athenrye's drug habit, their numerous exotic holidays abroad and their expensive choice of vehicles, the true extent to which they had degenerated became clear. When faced with the prospect of 100 republicans swelling the audience of their next gig they pleaded with leading Glasgow gangland boss, Paul Ferris (recently sentenced to 10yrs for gun-running) to 'mediate' between them and the incensed activists.

While many in Ireland are attempting to come to terms with both the physical and psychological scars of nearly 30 years of conflict, it is clear that others have 'had a good war.'

Lately an increasing number of Glasgow bands have begun playing republican functions in Ireland and others have been donating proceeds from CD's to POW welfare. Hopefully this will quickly become a growing trend.

If you want to pick up an Irish rebel CD my advice is go for the real thing. It may not be as well produced or slickly packaged, but why listen to those who profited from history when you can listen to those who made history?

Reproduced from RA Vol 3, Issue 4, Dec/Jan '98/'99

The Truce Is Out There

The following collection of articles from the RA Bulletin analyses the Peace Process from its beginnings until 1998. These articles first appeared together in booklet form. The foreword from the booklet is also included as is the appendix which details IRA statements during this period.

FOREWORD

IRA CALL THE SHOTS: BRITAIN BOMBED TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
Red Action No. 69: Autumn 1994

IRA CARDS ON THE TABLE: GUNS UNDER IT!
Red Action No. 70: Spring 1995

WINNING THE PEACE
Red Action No. 72: Autumn/Winter 1995

...NOTHING BUT THE TRUCE
Red Action No. 72: Autumn/Winter 1995

THEY THOUGHT IT WAS ALL OVER
Red Action No. 73: Spring 1996

MAD DOG AND ENGLISH WOMAN
Red Action No. 74: Spring 1997

TWELVE DAYS IN MAY
Red Action No. 75: Autumn 1997

CHANGED UTTERLY
Red Action Vol 3, Issue 2, August/September 1998

APPENDIX
IRA statements 31/08/94 to 04/04/96

Foreword

The all-party talks reached their conclusion and were hailed by the British, Irish and American governments as a "historic breakthrough". Among Irish Republicans and their supporters, however, there is some confusion about what exactly is on offer. There has been speculation about arms decommissioning, disbanding the RUC and the possible early release of prisoners, with `conditions' of course. It is important, however, to read between the lines and see that there is a bigger political picture to be drawn which puts the media hype about the `agreement' in the proper context.
It is right to be sceptical about the sincerity of the Brits and the Free Staters, but it is also right to be confident of the abilities of those who have led the Republican struggle for the past three decades. It is also important to recognise that the people who forced the Brits into negotiations with Sinn Fein were the Volunteer soldiers of the IRA. The British Establishment was bombed to the negotiating table. And when they made concessions to unionism which ended the first cease-fire, they were bombed back to the negotiating table. That in essence was the logical conclusion of the armed struggle. The Republican Movement wanted their enemies (Britain) to recognise their political representatives; acknowledge their right to argue for self determination; and recognise their right to negotiate a political settlement. There is a question that can be put quite seriously- to those various elements, from, the conservative British Left… (who never supported the IRA when the war was on, and who have now suddenly become `cease-fire soldiers'!)… to those quasi-religious republican fundamentalists, who are falling over each other to shout "Sell out!". The question is, `What is your alternative?'
The status quo? If that is what they are arguing for, and I've heard nothing from them to convince me otherwise, it puts them in the camp of the most reactionary elements in British and Irish society. That's what Paisley is arguing for and that is what right wing conservatives and fascists have been arguing for. It is also, interestingly enough, the position of the `securoerats' of the British secret state (MI5, SAS, RUC, Special Branch, etc.) Which camp would you rather be in?
Anyone who thinks that Sinn Fein, by taking part in the talks process, were in a position of weakness is seriously mistaken. Remember that this whole process was actually kicked off by the Republican Movement. The Hume/Adams talks should really have been called the Adams/Hume talks, because it was Sinn Fein rather than the SDLP who initiated the process. Republicanism not only had an overall strategy, it also set the agenda throughout this phase of the struggle. Gerry Adams said at the end of the all party talks that it was not a historic moment, only the start of another stage in the political process. We should listen carefully to what Adams and McGuinness are saying, rather than being fooled by the bluff and bluster of Trimble and company. As Gerry Kelly, councillor, ex-prisoner, and a member of Sinn Fein's negotiating team said, on Easter Tuesday in Ardoyne, "We want a national democracy. We want a United Ireland. Does it (the agreement) help or hinder it? That's the very basic question in all of this... This is our struggle. We're the experts on this issue."
Unionism will never be the same after these talks. The difference between the negotiations of the 1990's and those of the 1920's is that it is unionism rather than republicanism which is having to swallow the bitter pill of betrayal. Trimble is caught between a rock and a hard place. He knows that the British Establishment want out and he also knows that they are prepared to abandon him, if he doesn't tread carefully. Paisley looked like a tired old man outside Stormont when working class loyalists taunted and heckled him. This was significant because these are the very same people whom Paisley has always relied upon to deliver the hard-line loyalist votes for the DUP. Unionism's catchphrase word `No' is starting to wear thin with just about everybody.
The other sea-change may well be in Irish nationalism. In the 26 Counties, Sinn Fein have come from the position where, in the early 90's, they were forced to hold their Ard Fheis in a Dublin community centre due to a state ban. Now they are setting the political agenda in Ireland; certainly in the north, and they very soon will be in the south as well! The SDLP are worried that Sinn Fein may eat into their vote now that the war appears to be over, increasing their appeal to middle class nationalist voters. Whatever happens there's a lot more yet to be gone through than signing treaties and basking in the Brits' illusory `peace' .
As for decommissioning, even Billy Hutchison of the PUP/UVF wasn't falling for that one. On his way out of the talks he commented that, "decommissioning was never on the agenda. there won't be any weapons getting handed over by loyalists, and I don't expect you'll be getting any from the other lot either!" The forgotten man, John Major, has been wheeled back in by New Labour to promote this non-issue. This indicates that the Brits have already conceded that there will be no decommissioning this side of a united Ireland. On this issue, it might be prudent to remember what James Connolly said to the Irish Citizen's Army on the eve of the Easter Rising, "Hold on to your rifles..."

IRA Call The Shots : Britain Bombed To The Negotiating Table

Red Action No. 69: Autumn 1994.
 
For 25 years the British government has insisted that it is not engaged in a war which can be resolved by negotiations or treaties. The IRA, it said, was nothing more than a band of common criminals; a settlement with them was as unthinkable as one with the Kray gang. Today it is obvious that if there is to be a settlement it will be a negotiated one. But do the negotiations, "knocking heads together rather than knocking teeth out" as one republican spokesperson envisaged the process represent an IRA victory or an IRA defeat? Nobody knows. That is nobody in Britain knows. This includes British intelligence who apparently believed that an immediate cease-fire would follow the Downing St Declaration in December. And in that confusion and ignorance lies the answer.
In the same week the IRA cease-fire was announced, Neal Ascherson in the Independent on Sunday admitted that, having closely monitored media speculation throughout the week, he was, "staggered to discover that nobody had the faintest idea what to make of it". However the wild hypotheses offered by various `experts' still went a long way to answering the question. The answer was staring them in the face, but still the penny did not drop. If the British government did not know what was going on, then the cease-fire was not part of a Brit agenda. As the media grappled with this realisation, credit for ending the violence was offered, with various degrees of conviction to the American administration; John Hume; Fianna Fail. Indeed anybody but the architects of the peace process; the leadership of the Provisional IRA. The reason for the omission is clear. If indeed the cease-fire is part of an IRA agenda, it is out of strength rather than weakness and represents the beginning rather than the end of the process with more surprises to follow.
An IRA agenda means that the IRA have NOT bombed their way to the negotiating table: the `table' would not exist without them. It is their table. Far, far worse. The reality is they have bombed Britain there.
Proof of an `IRA agenda' and the foresight of the republican movement can be traced by the chronology of events. In1988 the republican movement published two discussion documents entitled: A Scenario for Peace; and Towards a Lasting Peace. These documents subsequently formed the basis for discussions between Gerry Adams and John Hume leader of the SDLP. These talks were not warmly welcomed; Hume was universally condemned for breaching protocol by talking to the men of violence. The unionists referred to him as a `dupe', yet Adams convinced him that it was a risk worth taking. After about 18 months the talks petered out. The war continued. In April 1993 it was leaked that Adams and Hume had again resumed dialogue and in September when they announced they had reached agreement, there was consternation. Hume was again denounced. The Dublin government refused to handle anything bearing Adams' `thumbprints'. Major declared that the thought of talking to Adams "turned his stomach". The strain on Hume, isolated as he was within his own party, was intense. If the IRA were not serious his career and reputation were finished. He needed constant reassurance. Throughout the negotiations with Dublin the republicans sat, as one described it, `literally holding his hand'. Eventually, when, in November, Hume collapsed of exhaustion, the Irish Taoiseach was handed the baton and began the next stage of the relay in talks with John Major. At the same time parallel discussions unknown to Dublin were being conducted between the British government and the IRA. Confronted by rumours of contacts with republicans, Sir Patrick Mayhew tried to reassure loyalists describing one report as belonging, "more properly in the fantasy of spy thrillers than in real life". Loyalists were not reassured. Then, possibly as an impetus to the talks between Dublin and London, Sinn Fein confirmed loyalist paranoia. Mayhew was humiliated. Britain in an effort to synchronise their public and private positions insisted that the Provisionals had initiated the contact with a communiqué that began: "The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close." In response the IRA made public the documentary evidence of the exchanges which left it in no doubt it was the republican movement from whom advice was required. In December 1993 Reynolds and Major signed the Downing St Declaration. At British insistence neither government referred to its parentage: the Hume/Adams talks. This was understandable. For Adams/Hume; Hume/Reynolds; Reynolds/Major were the necessary preliminaries to the main bout Adams/Major. And unlike previous occasions when the Brits and the `IRA' sat around the table as in 1972 and `75, this time as part of the republican strategy, they would do so publicly.
Expectation of a republican response to the Downing St declaration was intense. They obstinately demanded clarification. Major insisted none was necessary. There was much bluff and bluster from Dublin and London about "patience running out and carrying on the peace process without them". Eventually under international pressure Major caved in and detailed clarification was provided. In July Sinn Fein gave its response: accepting that the declaration was a step in the right direction but crucially was not in itself the basis for a solution. IRA REJECT PEACE! ran the headlines. But significantly Anglo-Irish talks were suspended in tacit acceptance that an element other than London and Dublin was setting the agenda. And again when the IRA announced the cease-fire nobody was more gobsmacked than the British government. Days earlier, Michael Ancram Minister of State privately dismissed rumours of a cease-fire as an IRA `gimmick'. (This needs to be put in perspective. In early August a twenty-five strong Red Action delegation to Belfast ALL knew that there was going to be a cease-fire. They KNEW it was going to begin in September though most understood it was to be of a three month duration. Major still believed it was only for three months a week after the IRA announced that it was a complete cessation.) On the day itself, within minutes of the announcement, timed to coincide with American breakfast news, Adams was conducting live interviews by phone on American television. In contrast the British government took hours to respond. Throughout the following week Major fussed over the word `permanent', in the process sacrificing any remaining credibility. Whoever was in control of the process, it certainly was not him.
Evidence of Adams' thumbprints apart, intense debate raged even within the republican movement itself. The secrecy with which the strategy was pursued created great alarm, in particular the genuine ignorance that existed over the basis for the initial Hume/Adams agreement. At a public meeting in Belfast in August a former prisoner who had served 16 years asked: `What right has Seamus Mallon (an SDLP MP) to see a document denied to me?' There was much suspicion, and even speculation privately of a sell-out, though this was more a result of inadequate political structures within Sinn Fein rather than an inadequate political strategy. (Within the IRA however, some felt that if the republican analysis was correct, that the Brits wanted out, then the time was ripe to launch the `Tet Offensive': hit the Brits with everything INCLUDING the kitchen sink.) So how might the irreconcilable be reconciled? Who had moved? Naturally there had to be a sell-out. The question was who was selling out who? The RCP's Irish Freedom Movement magazine reflecting much left wing opinion in England was emphatic:"There is no avoiding the grim reality that the peace process represents a historic defeat for the liberation movement." On the other hand the right wing Spectator journal gnashed: "Far from being marginalised the men of violence are to he moved centre stage. To say that the [Downing Street] Declaration was a great victory for the IRA is not rhetoric; it is hard Gradgrind fact."
Well, there can be little doubt as to who is centre stage. As to who has moved the evidence is equally stark. Margaret Thatcher once stated that the north of Ireland was, "...as English as Finchley..." Major and Mayhew have constantly repeated that their government has no "selfish, strategic or economic interest" in it. Accepting that it is indeed the British who have moved, the equally pertinent question it why now? It is readily admitted that the Baltic and Bishopsgate bombs carried a genuine and immediate threat to "London's pre-eminence as an international centre of capital… which increased the governments feeling that some sort of acclamation with the terrorists was inevitable." This, was no longer an `acceptable level of violence'. An IRA admission in October 1993 six months after Bishopsgate that " ...the IRA last summer were forced into abandoning 18 tons of explosives which were destined for six simultaneous bomb attacks on prestigious targets in London…" must have concentrated the British mind wonderfully. So is Britain preparing the way for a sell-out as loyalists contend? Stephen Glover in the Evening Standard thinks not: "Such a policy would be a suicide note for the British state. It could not be done. I am sure that Mr Major and Sir Patrick understand the dangers, and so I can't believe they are cynically planning a sell-out. But just because they are not planning a sell-out it does not mean there isn't going to be one. They are embarked on a process which they will be unable to control."
What then of the bloodbath scenario and the loyalist backlash, long presented by apologists as the justification for British occupation? Given that for a quarter of a century loyalist violence has been presented as reactive it was instructive to note that the instinctive response to the IRA cease-fire was to threaten `civil war'. But even as a notion this is fanciful. The loyalist paramilitaries lack the logistics, the political resolve and, crucially, a clear cut objective in the event of British withdrawal. Despite the seizure last November of two tons of explosives on a Polish registered ship at Teesport in Cleveland destined for the UVF, it is generally acknowledged that the entire operation was set up by MI5 with the cooperation of Polish Intelligence. Even if they had the gear, who would they bomb?
While the IRA have shown it possible to bomb someone out of your country, once they [Britain] had left it would be impossible [for Loyalists] to bomb them back in again. The more effective the military campaign the more effective the political alienation. And anyway bombing your `capital city' is hardly a display of loyalty that most people would comprehend.
Similarly bombing Dublin with or without help from British Intelligence would leave them instantly isolated nationally and internationally. Retribution could be expected to be swift. Nor do the Loyalists show the same commitment or resolve long associated with republicans. Their hunger strikes tend to begin after breakfast and end just before lunch; a recent roof-top protest in Crumlin Rd jail ended as soon as it got dark. Like the `laager louts' of the AWB when the time came, it transpired that they were prepared only to fight to the last drop of everyone else's blood. So if protracted military manoeuvres appear out of the question what room exists for political ones? Just as discouraging, since 1912 the preferred unionist strategy has been: Ulster says NO! And while the republican movement has produced its `Mandela' there is no hint of the emergence of a unionist De Klerk. If all the loyalist community can offer in the way of dialogue is monosyllabic, they will find themselves represented in negotiations by a surrogate, or safely ignored. A fate designed previously by Britain for the IRA.
If the future of unionism as a political entity is less than rosy what then the verdict on Britain, the co-accused? Since the mid 1980's at least, successive British administrations have wanted out. But they wanted to leave with dignity. During the 1981 Hunger-Strike Thatcher prophesied that the "IRA had played its last card." It was in fact directly the reverse. The IRA run the prisons. The screws have long ago lost the stomach for the fight. The position inside is a microcosm of a wider picture. Successive surveys of pubic opinion have shown that upwards of 60% are in favour of a British withdrawal. It is not that the British public are waving the white flag of surrender, it is more because they do not see it as their fight. After all, if the army is kicked out of Ulster; even a clear cut military victory would not be followed by a retributive invasion of the `mainland' by the IRA! So what do they care. As Edward Pearce pointed out in the Guardian: "The British voter doesn't give a damn for Ireland, united or otherwise. But a perceived withdrawal will be quickly seen as high-toned defeat, and that swiftly becomes very bad politics. How not to be there without having left is the conundrum of all British governments."
So while the British public are largely neutral in the governments fight with the IRA; being seen to lose would mean more than simply a loss of face.
After Suez, Britain awoke to find that it was no longer a world power. Now the crisis is within what is defined by the state as it's border. The subsequent fallout will impact directly not only on the government of the day but on the state itself. No longer a colonial power, the British establishment may find that when the dust settles it is now without even a stable democracy. If so, then the Downing St Declaration may well come to be regarded as the longest suicide note in history.